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ECURITIES regulation deals primarily with the laws preventing
and providing remedies for fraud in the sale of stocks and bonds.
Texas has two major statutes to combat securities fraud: the Texas
Securities Act (TSA) and what is referred to here as the Texas Stock
Fraud Act (TSFA). 1 Although this article includes Fifth Circuit cases
under federal law, the author attempts to limit the material to that involv-
ing state law, only touching federal securities law when necessary. The
author does not intend this article to exhaust all aspects of securities reg-
ulation but rather to update the Texas-based securities practitioner with
new developments of interest.
* H. Andy Professor of Commercial Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas; B.A., 1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1969, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E.
1969, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D. 1975, University of
Texas at Austin.
1. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581 (West 2011); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 27.01 (West 2011). TSFA is included in a statute also covering real estate fraud; so
many of the cases dealing with TSFA's statutory fraud deal with real estate. See § 27.01.
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I. ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE SECURITIES BOARD
The TSA created a regulatory body, the Texas State Securities Board
("Board"), to handle the registrations required by the TSA as well as to
serve as an enforcement mechanism.2 One of the Board's major goals
aims at stopping investment scams preying on the elderly, especially those
with inadequate knowledge or mental capabilities to perceive the scam. 3
These efforts led to conviction of the "free lunch" seminar scammer.4
The fraudster in Head v. State,5 allegedly a certified senior advisor, es-
tate planner, and wealth transfer practitioner with a team of profession-
als, advertised seminars including a complimentary lunch or dinner in
newspapers aimed at seniors.6 The fraudster originally sold trusts and
annuities to his senior clients, but after hiring a lawyer and observing a
joint venture purchasing distressed assets, the fraudster decided to form a
corporation with his lawyer to invest in distressed assets with moneys of
his senior clients. The private placement memorandum 7 prepared for the
corporation indicated contributions would be invested in distressed as-
sets. The selling agent told the senior clients their money would be in-
vested in credit card debt and foreclosed homes. Numerous senior clients
2. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. arts. 581-82 (West Supp. 2010).
3. See, e.g., Press Release, Tex State Sec. Bd., State Securities Regulators Lead Fight
Against Elder Investment Fraud and Abuse (June 15, 2010), available at http://www.ssb.
state.tx.us/News/PressRelease/06-15-10_press.php. (launching programs to educate medi-
cal professionals about identifying seniors vulnerable to financial abuse); Press Release,
Tex. State Sec. Bd., List of Texas "Top 10" Investment Scams, Schemes, and Scandals Is-
sued by Texas Securities Commissioner (Jan. 14, 2004), available at http:/www.ssb.state.tx.
us/News/Press-Release/prl-14-04.pdf. (listing senior fraud, by targeting seniors with com-
plex investment scams promising inflated returns, as second on the list).
4. See, e.g., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Sec. and Exch.
Comm., et al., Protecting Senior Investors: Report of Examinations of Securities Firms
Providing "Free Lunch" Sales Seminars, (Sept. 2007) (joint examination by the SEC, the
North American Securities Administrators Association, and the Financial Industry Regula-
tory Authority regarding "free lunch" seminars aimed at selling financial products, often to
seniors, with a free meal as enticement, revealing potentially misleading sales materials and
potential suitability issues relating to the products discussed at the seminars), available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/seniors/freelunchreport.pdf.
5. 299 S.W.3d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref'd). This article
omits the issues on misapplication of fiduciary property, jury charge, continuance, and ef-
fectiveness of assistance of counsel.
6. Id. at 420.
7. The TSA provides an exemption from registration of securities for sale without
any public solicitation or advertisements. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5(I)
(West 2010). The Board's rule under this exemption requires sales to well-informed inves-
tors-a requirement sellers can satisfy by delivering a private placement memorandum prior
to the sale. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 109.13(a)(1) (2010) (Tex. State Sec. Bd., Banking
and Securities) ("The term 'well-informed' could be satisfied through the dissemination of
printed material to each purchaser prior to his or her purchase, which by a fair and factual
presentation discloses the plan of business, the history, and the financial statements of the
issuer, including material facts necessary in order that the statements made in the light of
circumstances under which they are made, not be misleading."). Since the selling agent did
not deliver the private placement memorandum before the investment sale and it con-
tained serious omissions of material facts, see Head, 299 S.W.3d at 427-30, the Board sanc-
tioned the promoters for selling unregistered securities. See In re Head, et al., No. ENF-




cashed in retirement funds and annuities to invest in the corporation and
incurred substantial surrender penalties. 8 It became apparent early on
that the corporation lacked sufficient funds to invest in distressed assets,
so the fraudster invested these funds in the lawyer's personal injury litiga-
tion making loans to himself and his lawyer. The selling agent never dis-
closed to his senior clients the loans to the fraudster and lawyer, that the
lawyer filed a previous bankruptcy, that the Board issued a cease and
desist order for later,9 and that the fraudster filed for bankruptcy and
consented to a judgment for violating the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act.
The senior clients invested more than $3.7 million, of which only $450,000
was left when the corporation entered receivership. Indicted in Galves-
ton by the district attorney for securities fraud, 10 a jury convicted the
fraudster and sentenced him to thirty-two years confinement and a
$10,000 fine.'1
The securities law issue for the appellate court was whether the evi-
dence was sufficient for conviction. 12 The district attorney charged the
fraudster in the disjunctive, with one misrepresentation about investing
moneys in distressed assets and six omissions concerning the two bank-
ruptcies, the Iowa judgment, the Board's cease and desist orders, the
loans to the fraudster and lawyer, and the other uses of money. Because
the charge was in the disjunctive, the court of appeals only needed to
consider the evidence to support one charge. 13 The court of appeals se-
lected the failure to disclose the investments in other than distressed as-
sets. 14 The fraudster contended the private placement memorandum had
clear boilerplate language stating the corporation could invest the mon-
eys in any asset. But four investors testified at trial they never saw a
8. Head, 299 S.W.3d at 421.
9. See In re Head, 2004 WL 17984, at *2 (selling unregistered securities when not
registered as a dealer); see also In re Nat'l CD Brokers, No. CDO-1540, 2003 WL
22279544, at *2-3 (Tex. State Sec. Bd. Sept. 23, 2003) (emergency cease and desist order
for similar offenses).
10. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-29(C) (West 2010) ("In connection with
the sale, offering for sale or delivery of, the purchase, offer to purchase, invitation of offers
to purchase, invitations of offers to sell, or dealing in any other manner in any security or
securities, whether or not the transaction or security is exempt under Section 5 or 6 of this
Act, directly or indirectly: ... (3) knowingly make any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading ... (4) ... is guilty of a
felony and upon conviction shall be . . . (c) imprisoned for life or for not less than 5 or
more than 99 years and fined not more than $10,000, if the amount involved is $100,000 or
more.").
11. Head, 299 S.W.3d. at 419. The trial court in another proceeding also convicted the
attorney. See Press Release, Tex. State Sec. Bd., Former Texas Lawyer Admits to De-
frauding the Elderly Sentenced to Confinement in State Prison (Oct. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.ssb.state.tx.us/news/Pres Release/pr_10-10-07.pdf (seven years' confinement);
see also In re Wintford E. Verkin II, No. 07-9078 (May 23, 2007) (revoking the lawyer's law
license), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MiscDocket/07/07907800.pdf
(last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
12. Head, 299 S.W.3d at 425.
13. See Martinez v. State, 129 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (proof on any
one alternative mean is sufficient for conviction).
14. Id. at 445.
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private placement memorandum, a fifth testified he was not allowed any
time to read it until after the selling agent had left with his money, and a
sixth testified the selling agent did not allow him to keep it for reading
and study.15 Thus, these investors were not alerted by the private place-
ment memorandum concerning the use of their moneys. Lastly, the
fraudster contended the selling agent told the investors that the corpora-
tion would not invest all the moneys in distressed assets. The testimony
of the selling agent indicated only a seventh investor was told about in-
vestments in personal injury lawsuits, but not about the loans and other
non-distressed assets. Consequently, the court of appeals affirmed the
conviction.16
II. REGISTRATION OF MARKET OPERATORS
One underpinning of securities in state regulation is the requirement to
register in the state as a seller of securities before selling securities and as
an investment advisor before rendering investment advice.1 7 The Board
made a number of changes to dealer and agent registration as well as
investment adviser and investment adviser representative registration,
generally adopting the standards of the North American Securities Ad-
ministrators Association (NASAA).18 The Board created a restricted re-
gistration for investment-banking dealers by (allowing them to take a
shorter examination on general securities principles without emphasis on
retail sales not part of their business)1 9 substituting the passing percent-
age for dealers on examinations specified by the NASAA for the former
Texas percentage, 20 requiring supervising systems maintained by dealers
and by investment advisers designed to achieve compliance with all appli-
cable securities laws not just Texas securities laws, 21 and replacing several
Texas forms with NASAA forms.22
The Board has authority to deny, revoke, or suspend a license granted
to dealers, agents, and investment advisor representatives for any felony
or misdemeanor that directly relates to their duties and responsibilities. 23
In 2009, the Texas Legislature authorized occupational licenses for poten-
tial applicants to obtain preliminary information regarding their eligibility
before beginning a training program for that occupation and allowed a
15. Id. at 429.
16. Id. at 426.
17. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-12(A)-(B); 581-13(A) (West 2011).
18. Adopted Rules, Tex. State Sec. Bd., (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.ssb.state.tx.us/
TexasSecurities Act-and BoardRules/AdoptedRules/August_16_2010.php.
19. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 115.1(c)(2)(N) (West 2011) (Tex. State Sec. Bd.,
Banking and Securities).
20. Id. § 115.3(a).
21. Id. § 115.10(a) (dealer supervision); § 116-10 (investment adviser supervision).
22. Id. §§ 133.5, 133.6, 133.9, 133.11, 133.29, 133.30, 133.34 (adopting new forms with-
out comment); see also 35 Tex. Reg. 2428 (2010), adopted 35 Tex. Reg. 7051 (2010) (repeal-
ing former forms).
23. See 7 TEx. ADMIN. CODE ANN. §§ 115.6(a) (for dealers and agents) & 116.6(a)




licensing authority to charge a fee for requesting a criminal history evalu-
ation letter.24 The Board added a rule providing the procedure to request
a criminal history evaluation letter at a fee of $100 for registration by
dealers and agents and by investment advisers and investment adviser
representatives.2 5
Each year there is at least one court opinion depicting a party-litigant
as a legal buffoon for wasting the court's time with a frivolous lawsuit.
This year's effort involved a training company whose principals at best
were unaware they were rendering investment advisor services. 26 One
can but wonder whether the court has so slanted a few selected facts to
make the party-litigant's lawyer look incompetent or whether the lawyer
so convinced his client to pursue the quixotic matter to fatten the legal
bill. In S & D Trading Academy, LLC v. AAFIS Inc., two principals
formed a company training foreign citizens to day-trade stocks on an in-
vestment company's account in the United States stock market.27 Train-
ing began under an oral agreement while the companies negotiated a
written contract. The oral agreement between the training company and
the investment company provided a one dollar fee for every thousand
shares traded during a probationary six-month period and thereafter for
thirty-six months. The training consisted of monitoring- the trainees' live,
online trading activities and providing them with market research, stock
recommendations, and trading strategies at the beginning of each day,
and specifying the maximum loss each trainee could sustain before re-
quiring the trader to exit the market for that day.28 Negotiations for the
written contract collapsed and the training company sued the investment
company for perceived unpaid compensation. The TSA prohibits render-
ing investment advice in Texas unless registered under the TSA or ex-
empt from such registration.29 The TSA further prohibits lawsuit under a
contract violating any provision of the TSA.30 The training company con-
ceded its services constituted investment advice, 31 but contended the
24. See TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 53.101 (West Supp. 2010); see also Act of Jan. 30,
2009, 81st Leg., R.S., § 1, sec. 53D, 2009 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 616 (West) (adding section
53D to the occupations code).
25. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 104.7(a)(1) (West 2011) (Tex. State Sec. Bd., Bank-
ing and Securities (adopting new rule without comment). The rule addition required
amendments to two other rules referring to the new procedure. See §115.6(d) (adopting
amended rule without comment) (for dealers and agents); § 116.6(d) (adopting amended
rule without comment) (for investment advisers and investment adviser representatives).
26. S & D Trading Acad., LLC v. AAFIS, Inc., 336 F. App'x 443, 444 (5th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 1054 (2010).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 445.
29. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-12B (West 2011) ("a person may not,
directly or through an investment adviser representative, render services as an investment
adviser in this state unless the person is registered under this Act ... or is otherwise ex-
empt under this Act.").
30. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33K (West 2011) ("[n]o person who has
made or engaged in the performance of any contract in violation of any provision of this
Act or any rule or order or requirement hereunder... may base any suit on the contract").
31. See S & D Trading Acad., LLC v. AAFIS Inc., No. G-06-739, 2008 WL 2325167, at
*1 (S.D. Tex. June 3, 2008).
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training company fits the teacher exemption from registration as an in-
vestment adviser.32 The district court dismissed the action on the basis
that one SEC no-action letter concluded under an almost identical provi-
sion in the federal statute that the teacher exemption applied only to ac-
tual teachers who work for accredited and certified institutions or schools
of higher learning.33 The district court assessed the investment com-
pany's legal costs against the training company, stating had the training
company sought out competent legal advice before entering into the
transaction, it would have been advised to register. 34
The securities law issue for the Fifth Circuit was the interpretation of
TSA's exemption from investment adviser registration for teachers. 35
The training company asserted that a federal administrative decision
under federal law did not constitute precedential authority for a court
interpreting the TSA. Instead, the training company concluded the court
should follow Texas law requiring courts to give terms, not otherwise de-
fined, their ordinary meaning. 36 For a teacher, that was one who teaches.
Because Texas state courts have not rendered decisions on the definition
of investment adviser, the Fifth Circuit proceeded as any Texas state
court would.37 Recognizing a future Texas court could define the term
"investment adviser" differently, the Fifth Circuit noted that in interpret-
ing the TSA both Texas state courts and the Fifth Circuit have previously
used federal decisions interpreting federal securities laws, due to similari-
ties between the securities laws of both jurisdictions.38 The Fifth Circuit
noted the federal Investment Adviser Act contains a virtually identical
investment adviser definition.39 The Fifth Circuit noted that federal
32. See id.; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4N(2) (West 2011).
33. See S & D Trading Acad., 2008 WL 2325167, at *1 (citing Joseph P. Canouse, SEC
No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 10657 (May 26, 1977)).
34. S & D Trading Acad., 336 F. App'x at 444-45; see also S & D Trading Acad., 2008
WL 2325167, at *1 (consult attorney).
35. S & D Trading A cad., 336 F. App'x at 447.
36. Id.; TEX. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 311.011(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2010) ("Words and
phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and
common usage.... Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular mean-
ing, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly."); see
also Guitar Holding Co., v. Hudspeth Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1,
263 S.W.3d 910, 915 (Tex. 2008) (terms "not otherwise defined are typically given their
ordinary meaning").
37. S & D Trading Acad., 336 F. App'x at 447.
38. Id.; see, e.g., Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 563 (5th
Cir. 2002) (interpreting the TSA's fraud provision); Star Supply Co. v. Jones, 665 S.W.2d
194, 196 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ) (defining "securities"); see also Searsy v.
Commercial Trading Corp., 560 S.W.2d 637,639-41 (Tex. 1977) (using federal law to define
"investment contract" and "evidence of indebtedness" as securities); George Lee Flint, Jr.,
Securities Regulation, 56 SMU L. REV. 1995, 2017 (2003) (discussing Herrmann Holdings
Ltd); accord TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. (West 2011) (portions of the TSA
are based on federal securities laws).
39. S & D Trading Acad., 336 F. App'x at 447. Compare TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 581-4N (West 2010) (an investment adviser is "a person who, for compensation, en-
gages in the business of advising another, either directly or through publications or writ-
ings, with respect to the value of securities or to the advisability of investing in, purchasing,
or selling securities or a person who, for compensation and as part of a regular business,
[Vol. 64
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courts, although not bound by the SEC no-action letters which bind only
the SEC and subject of the letter, may consider them persuasive authority
when interpreting a federal provision.40 The Fifth Circuit then examined
several SEC no-action letters noting the SEC found the teacher exemp-
tion to registration unavailable for teaching individuals how to invest in
the stock market, one-day seminars on opportunities currently available
in securities markets, stock market school, and college courses in stock
market strategy because they were not offered by accredited educational
institutions.41 The Fifth Circuit found these no-action letters persuasive
and the teacher exemption from registration of investment advisers un-
available because the training company was unaccredited, the principals
were not professional teachers, and the training was not academic in na-
ture.42 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.43
For those that do not find SEC no-action letters persuasive, note the
Texas statutory interpretation rule requires courts to construe accordingly
words with technical meanings, "whether by legislative definition or oth-
erwise."'44 The teacher exemption to registration for investor advisers is
one such technical term. The federal Investment Adviser Act created the
term "investment adviser" including the teacher exemption in 1940,45 the
SEC no-action letters gave the term and its teacher exemption a technical
meaning in the 1970s,46 and the Texas Legislature added the federal lan-
guage to the TSA in 200047 knowing that technical meaning.
issues or adopts analyses or a report concerning securities .... The term does not include
.... 2) a lawyer, accountant, engineer, teacher, or geologist whose performance of the
services is solely incidental to the practice of the person's profession.") with 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-2(a)(11) (2010) (an investment adviser is "any person who, for compensation, en-
gages in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings
as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promul-
gates analyses or reports concerning securities; but does not include ... (B) any lawyer,
accountant, engineer, or teacher whose performance of such services is solely incidental to
the practice of his profession.").
40. S & D Trading Acad., 336 F. App'x at 448; see, e.g., Allaire Corp. v. Okumus, 433
F.3d 248, 254 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding the no-action letter persuasive); accord Gryl ex rel.
Shire Pharm. Grp. PLC v. Shire Pharm. Grp. PLC, 298 F.3d 136, 145 (2d Cir. 2002) (no-
action letters are not agency rule-making nor adjudication and thus entitled to no more
deference beyond their persuasive value; not finding the no-action letter persuasive).
41. S & D Trading Acad., 336 F. App'x at 448-49; see Joseph P. Canouse Esq., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 10657 (July 15, 1977) (teaching individuals); David A. Um-
stead, SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 WL 12176 (Aug. 13, 1976) (one-day seminars); J.H.
Rodgas, Jr., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 10941 (Sept. 7, 1974) (stock market school);
Frank T. Hines, SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 WL 8250 (Aug. 21, 1972) (unaccredited col-
lege course).
42. S & D Trading Acad., LLC, 336 F. App'x at 449-50.
43. Id. at 453.
44. TEX. Gov'-r CODE ANN. § 311.011(b) (West 2011) (emphasis added).
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(B) (2011).
46. See supra note 29.




One major reason legislatures passed securities acts was to facilitate
investors' actions to recover their moneys through a simplified fraud ac-
tion that removed scienter and privity, the most difficult elements to
prove in a common-law fraud action.48 These securities act lawshifts gen-
erally apply only to the primary market. When investors purchase in the
secondary market their actions reintroduce these obstacles. Moreover,
Congress added additional burdens to secondary market securities fraud
actions through the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA).49
A. COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE TEXAS ACTS
The opinions under the TSA and TSFA raised three issues of interest
concerning aiding and abetting, projections, and misrepresentations.
1. No Aiding and Abetting Liability for Failure to Whistle-Blow
Absent a Duty
When investments sour, injured investors seek to recover moneys from
solvent defendants, such as third parties that enable an alleged fraud per-
petrator to sell securities. Because federal law severely limits aiding and
abetting lawsuits by private investors against third parties under federal
securities laws,50 such actions are more common under state blue sky
laws.5 1 The TSA specifically allows investors to sue aiders and abettors
of perpetrators in the sale or purchase of a security to those investors.52
This year's effort by investors essentially sought to impose aider and abet-
48. George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 56 SMU L. REV. 1995, 2016 (2003).
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2010).
50. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
191 (1994) (holding a private plaintiff cannot maintain an implied cause of action for aiding
and abetting under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act). The Congressional response to Cen-
tral Bank of Denver was to amend the Exchange Act in 1995, and not the Securities Act, to
permitting the SEC to bring aiding and abetting actions, see 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2010) (in
action by SEC, person providing substantial assistance to perpetrator also liable), thereby
foreclosing aiding and abetting liability under the Securities Act. Recently, the Supreme
Court foreclosed attempts to circumvent the ban on private aiding and abetting lawsuits by
recharacterizing the action as a primary violation of Rule lOb-5 (participation in a decep-
tive scheme without a communication to the public). See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 161 (2008) (scheme liability extending securities lia-
bilities beyond the securities markets to basic contracts violates the Court's precedents);
see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 62 SMU L. REV. 1435, 1458-59 (2009)
(discussing Stoneridge, a case impacting prior Texas decisions).
51. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 540 F. Supp. 2d
759, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (investment banker aiding and abetting under the TSA); Kastner
v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 231 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (attor-
ney aiding and abetting under the TSA); see also Flint, supra note 50, at 1452; George Lee
Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 61 SMU L. REV. 1107, 1119-20 (2008) (discussing Kastner).
52. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(F)(2) (West 2011) ("A person who
directly or indirectly with intent to deceive or defraud or with reckless disregard for the
truth or the law materially aids a seller, buyer, or issuer of a security is liable under Section
33A, 33B, or 33C jointly and severally with the seller, buyer, or issuer, and to the same
extent as if he were the seller, buyer, or issuer.").
[Vol. 64
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tor liability on an accounting firm for not warning the investors of fraud
committed by an issuer.53 The issuer had engaged in a Ponzi scheme,
another of the Board's top investment scams.54
In Navarro v. Grant Thornton, LLP, the Houston Court of Appeals
dealt with a sale and lease-back of coin-operated payphones to investors
by two corporate promoters, both using the same business model and
having the principal of one promoter serving as a consultant to the other
promoter. 55 The business model called for the promoter to sell
payphones to distributors who would resell them to the investors for a
profit, and the investors would then lease the payphones back to the pro-
moter for sixty months with a full refund buy-back provision on 180 days
notice. At the end of the lease term, each investor could manage their
payphone themselves, renew the lease for an additional sixty months, or
sell the payphones back to the promoter.56 The revenues received by the
promoters from the payphone users were never enough to cover the pro-
moters' lease payments to the investors, so the promoters used proceeds
received from additional payphone sales to new investors to satisfy the
lease payments to earlier investors. To prevent alerting the investors, the
promoters sought a non-GAAP method to account for the sale transac-
tions of payphones to the investors (as operating leases, thereby recogniz-
ing income from the payphone sales). 57 Both original accountants, who
withdrew from preparation of audited financial statements over the issue,
and defendant accountants, hired to replace the original accountants
under the belief they could be persuaded to use the non-GAAP method,
concluded that accountants must account for the transactions in accor-
dance with GAAP (as capital leases, a financing revealing the losses, due
to the repurchase option).58 Within two years the promoters could no
longer make their lease payments, the SEC sought civil enforcement ac-
tions against the promoters for selling unregistered securities (the sale
and lease-back of the payphones amount to an investment contract or
security) and committing fraud (failing to inform investors of the promot-
ers' losses and the Ponzi scheme of paying earlier investors with moneys
from new investors), one promoter went into receivership, and the other
53. Navarro v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 316 S.W.3d 715, 717 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
54. See Press Release, Tex. State Sec. Bd., List of Texas "Top 10" Investment Scams,
Schemes, and Scandals Issued by Texas Securities Commissioner (Jan. 14, 2004) (listing
Ponzi Schemes, using moneys from new investors to pay returns to old investors, as first on
the list).
55. Navarro, 316 S.W.3d at 717. This article omits the issue on the statute of limita-
tions for conspiracy to defraud.
56. See Brief for Appellant, Navarro v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 316 S.W. 3d 715 (Tex.
App-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (No. 14-08-00482-CV), 2009 WL 1225582 at *3.
57. See id. at *7 (promoter feared investor panic because it owed more money on the
180-day buy-backs than it had); id. at *10 (treatment as an operating lease if promoter had
sold the payphones to a third party, owned no risk, and received a stream of fees for
providing services).
58. See id. at *10 n.18.
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into bankruptcy. 59 Texas investors sued the solvent accounting firm three
years later for violating securities laws under the TSA as an aider and
abettor of the promoters (not registering securities and omitting material
information in the sales materials). 60 The trial court granted summary
judgment for the accounting firm.61
The securities law issue for the court of appeals involved whether the
aider and abettor had rendered substantial assistance to the perpetrator,
one element of the cause of action.62 With respect to whistle-blowing
failures to disclose to regulators or investors issues relating to a Ponzi
scheme and siphoning of funds by the principal of one promoter,63 the
court of appeals concluded that a court, in the absence of a duty to dis-
close neither asserted or briefed by the investors, could not consider fail-
ures to whistle-blow in determining if the accountant firm substantially
assisted the perpetrator. 64 With respect to other omissions and misstate-
ments made to regulators relating to the inability to continue as a "going
concern, '65 there was no evidence that the accountant interacted with the
59. Navarro, 316 S.W.3d at 718; see SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 392 (2004) (describ-
ing the payphone scheme as a classic investment contract); id. at 397 (not telling investors
that the promoter failed to make a profit, lost money on the payphones, and depended on
funds from new investors to sustain operations constituted fraud).
60. Navarro, 316 S.W.3d at 718; see TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-33(A)(1)
(unregistered securities) & 33(A)(2) (West 2010) (omission of material information). Ad-
ditionally, the Board sanctioned a Texas seller of the payphone investment contracts. See
In re Todd Robert Fecht, No. CDO-1457, 2002 WL 927153 at *1 (Tex. State Sec. Bd. Apr.
24, 2002) (cease and desist order for selling ETS Payphones, Inc. Equipment Lease Pro-
gram without registering as a dealer).
61. Navarro, 316 S.W.3d at 718.
62. Id. at 720. The elements in a cause of action for aider and abettor liability under
the TSA are: (1) a primary violation of the TSA by the perpetrator, (2) the aider's general
awareness of the violation, (3) the aider's substantial assistance in the violation, and (4) the
aider's intent to deceive or reckless disregard of the truth or law. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 675 (Tex. 1998) (approving a jury instruction that added an aware-
ness element to the other three elements obvious from the statute); see also Frank v. Bear,
Stearns & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)
(listing the four elements).
63. Navarro, 316 S.W.3d at 721 (investors alleged the accounting firm failed to disclose
that the business model was a Ponzi scheme, there was a relationship between the promot-
ers and one of their principals, this principal received moneys on each sale of payphones
and siphoned investor funds to other corporations, and there was an investigation by the
Pennsylvania Securities Commission).
64. Noting there was some evidence that accountants had a duty to their client (in this
case the perpetrator) to disclose the fraud, the court of appeals bolstered its opinion with
two cases interpreting New York common law fiduciary law, albeit in the securities context.
Id. at 721-22 (citing Eurycleia Partners, LP v. Seward & Kissel, LLP, 910 N.E.2d 976, 981
(N.Y. 2009); Stanfield Offshore Leveraged Assets, Ltd. V. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 883
N.Y.S.2d 486, 489-90 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)).
65. Id. at 722 (failures to include a "Going Concern" paragraph in the promoters'
audited and compiled financial statements); id. at 724-25 (alleging the following omissions
and misstatements before the Pennsylvania Securities Commission: (1) notes to one pro-
moter's compiled GAAP statements prepared by the accountant indicated the operating
loss does not reflect an inability to continue as a going concern, (2) a draft letter of pro-
moter's chief financial officer to the Pennsylvania Securities Commission claimed the ac-
countant would issue an audited financial statement opinion without qualification, and (3)
the accountant proposed to retroactively restructure to remove liabilities from that pro-
moter's GAAP financial statements but that was not done; also alleging the following
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investors, that the investors heard about the accountant from the sellers,
or that the investors received the accountant-prepared financial state-
ments. Consequently, the court of appeals concluded that no reasonable
jury member could find the accountant rendered substantial assistance
and affirmed the trial court.66
Aiders and abettors can obtain little comfort from the Navarro opin-
ion. The failure of the court of appeals to craft a safe-harbor rule sug-
gests that this appellate court prefers to follow a fact laden case-by-case
approach in determining substantial assistance. The appellee-accountant
asserted the accountant's mere performance of routine professional work
cannot amount to substantial assistance. 67 This thought appears nowhere
in the Navarro opinion. With respect to the absence of a duty, the SEC
once had this problem for misappropriators of inside information that it
solved by alleging a duty to the employer in the next case. 68 Moreover,
the statutory trend imposes some whistle-blowing obligations. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the SEC to issue rules requiring attorneys
to report evidence regarding a material violation of securities laws or
breach of fiduciary duty to the issuer's chief legal counsel or to an appro-
priate committee of the issuer's board of directors. 69 The recently passed
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act goes fur-
ther and provides financial incentives of 10% to 30% of the SEC's sanc-
tion to individuals who report securities and accounting fraud to the SEC,
pursuant to the SEC's rules, if it leads to sanctions in excess of one mil-
lion dollars. 70 Furthermore, the appellate court's finding an absence of
contact between the investors and aider and abettor, including a commu-
nication about the aider and abettor by the securities's sellers, suggests
substantial assistance could arise when sellers use the aider and abettor's
omissions and misstatements before the SEC: (1) accountant stated the promoter's GAAP
financial statements depicted a worse financial condition than it actually was, (2) account-
ants were unable to make a determination whether the promoter needed to keep selling
payphones to meet obligations).
66. Id. at 728.
67. See Brief for Appellee & Cross-Appellant at B, Navarro v. Grant Thornton, LLP,
316 S.W. 3d 715 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (No. 14-08-00482-CV),
2008 WL 6491768, at *9. Before 1994, when federal courts allowed aiding and abetting
lawsuits by private investors under federal law, the Fifth Circuit's awareness/intent test
required clear proof of intent to violate securities laws by an aider if the aider was involved
in daily grist mill activities but allowed a possible inference of knowledge for unusual activ-
ities. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Dealy, 911 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1990); Woodward v.
Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975).
68. For failure to allege a duty, see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
For duty to the employer alleged, see SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984).
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2011); see also 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2011) (rule requiring
attorneys that practice before the SEC to report evidence of a material violation).
Sarbanes-Oxley Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act
(Sarbanes-Oxley) of 2002 § 307.
70. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Return and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)
of 2010 § 87u-6(b)(1) (2011); see also Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower
Provisions of Section 21F of the Security Exchange Act release No. 63237, 75 Fed. Reg.
70.488 (Nov. 17, 2010).
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firm documents or reputation as approving the investment. When known
by the aider and abettor, a duty to disclose might arise.
2. No Liability for Projections of Future Performance not Worded as
Guarantees
Federal courts also deal with securities fraud lawsuits brought under
the TSA or the TSFA when coupled with a federal action. In the first of
such cases, Arkoma Basin Project Limited Partnership v. West Fork En-
ergy Company LLC, the Fifth Circuit dealt with an action under both the
TSA and federal securities laws (Rule lOb-5), 71 namely a breach of duty
to conduct natural gas production operations in a good and workmanlike
manner.72 Frequently, contract lawsuits also involve securities, here an
undivided interest in oil and gas rights. 73 An operating company origi-
nally owned the natural gas leases. The promoters, in order to purchase
the natural gas leases, formed a limited liability company, entered into
negotiations with an energy company to purchase a fifty percent working
interest in the leases, and prepared a business plan for the energy com-
pany outlining a first-year development plan to reconnect shut-in wells
and drill additional wells, with projections of the production volume and
generated revenues. When negotiations with the energy company failed,
two brokers assisting the sale74 formed a limited partnership, created a
prospectus from the business plan by altering some of its data, and re-
cruited twelve limited partners. The limited liability company and limited
partnership, both Texas residents, 75 entered into a purchase agreement
with the operating company to acquire the natural gas leases. As part of
the purchase agreement, the limited partnership and operating company
entered into a joint operating agreement. Neither the purchase agree-
ment nor operating agreement mentioned the business plan. A subse-
quent natural gas boom resulted in shortages of personnel and
equipment, leading to higher operating costs. The operating company
was only able to complete the first phase of the business plan and sought
additional funds from a hedge fund. Negotiations for additional funds
71. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
72. Arkoma Basin Project LP v. W. Fork Energy Co., 384 F. App'x 375, 379 (5th Cir.
2010). This article omits the issues on evidence, jury influence, and legal fees.
73. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4A (West 2011) ("The term 'security'...
shall include ... any instrument representing any interest in or under an oil, gas or mining
lease, fee or title .... ); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2011) ("the term 'security'
means.. .fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights .... ").
74. See Brief for Appellant at *7; Arkoma Basin Project LP v. W. Fork Energy Co.,
384 F. App'x 375 (5th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-40011), 2009 WL 6621745 at *7; see also Arkoma
Basin Project LP, 384 F. App'x at 377 (describing one broker as a co-crafter of the business
plan).
75. See Brief for Appellant, Arkoma Basin Project LP at *13 n.3; see also West Fork
Energy Company, LL C, CORPORATION WIKI, http://www.corporationwiki.com/Texas/Fort-
WorthfWest-fork-energy-company-l-l-c/38610410.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2011) (filed in
Texas July 14, 2003); Arkoma Basin Limited Partnership, CORPORATION WIKI, http://www.
corporationwiki.com/Texas/Dallas/arkoma-basin-project-limited-partnershipl36671878.
aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2011) (filed in Texas Sept. 21, 2004).
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failed when the limited partnership refused to sign a letter of intent with
the hedge fund and instead brought suit under the TSA and federal law
against the promoters, the operating company, and the limited liability
company for breach of contract and securities fraud. At the conclusion of
the limited partnership's case in chief, the district court granted summary
judgment on the grounds that the limited partnership provided no evi-
dence of reliance on the misrepresentations contained in the business
plan.76 The Fifth Circuit affirmed but on different grounds. 77
The securities law issue for the Fifth Circuit was whether the alleged
misstatement was actionable under the TSA and federal securities laws
for the facts elicited by the limited partnership. 78 The misstatement was
using the projections from the business plan to entice investors to invest
with no intent to take the necessary steps to achieve those projections.79
The Fifth Circuit examined the materiality and scienter elements of the
cause of action, 80 rather than focus on reliance because the TSA does not
require reliance for an action against the seller.81 The TSA also does not
require scienter82 except for an untrue promise of future performance.83
With respect to materiality, the Fifth Circuit noted projections of future
performance are not actionable unless accompanied by language of guar-
antee,84 which the projections in the business plan did not have. With
respect to scienter, the Fifth Circuit noted promises of future perform-
76. See Brief for Appellant at *7, Arkoma Basin Project LP v. W. Fork Energy Co.,
384 F. App'x 375 (5th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-40011), 2009 WL 6621745 at *13 (there can be no
reliance on the business plan drafted by the promoters because the business plan was mate-
rially altered and changed; the district court also doubted the TSA and federal securities
laws applied because there was no security, just a purchase contract).
77. Arkoma Basin Project, 384 F. App'x at 383.
78. Id. at 380.
79. Id.
80. Id. For the TSA the investor needs to prove (1) the promoter offered or sold a
security, (2) the promoter made an untrue statement or omission of a material fact, and (3)
the untrue statement or omission is the means by which the sale of the security was made.
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33A(2) (West 2010) ("A person who offers or sells
a security ... by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission to state a
material fact ... is liable to the person buying the security from him... ").
81. See, e.g., Weatherly v. Deloitte & Touche, 905 S.W.2d 642, 648-49 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd w.o.j.); see also Granader v. McBee, 23 F.3d 120, 123
(5th Cir. 1994). Perhaps the reliance requirement has been replaced by "by means of,"
requiring proof that the misstatement or omission (1) related to the security sold and (2)
induced the purchase. See Pitman v. Lightfoot, 937 S.W.2d 496, 531 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1996, writ denied); Nicholas v. Crocker, 687 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d 1408,
1419 n.24 (5th Cir. 1993).
82. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 343-44 (5th Cir. 2008); see
also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 56 SMU L. REV. 1995, 2005 (2003) (dis-
cussing Dorsey). The TSA makes the absence of scienter a defense with burden of proof
on the seller. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33A(2) (West 2011) (unless the
"person... liable ... sustains the burden of proof that [he] did not know.., of the untruth
or omission.").
83. See Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 563-64 (5th Cir.
2002); see also Flint, supra note 82, at 2017 (discussing Herrmann Holdings Ltd).
84. Arkoma Basin Project, 384 F. App'x at 380. For interpretations of the TSA's pro-
vision for a fraud remedy, Texas courts are advised to use federal law because it is so
similar. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. (West 2011) (portions of the TSA are
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ance required proof the promoter had no intention of performing when
making the misrepresentation. 85 Because the promoters actually com-
pleted the first phase of the projections and made serious efforts to com-
plete the second phase, that required intent was absent. Similarly, the
federal action under Rule 10b-5 86 requires the same two elements of ma-
teriality and scienter.87
The Arkoma Basin Project Limited Partnership case would appear to
be another opinion that depicts a party-litigant as a legal buffoon for
wasting the court's time with a frivolous lawsuit. But this time the slant-
ing of a few selected facts to make the party-litigant's lawyer look incom-
petent may be aimed at disguising the weak law clerking of the district
court. The district court had the right idea that there was no cause of
action, but was unable to provide a reason with respect to the TSA. The
Fifth Circuit continued the cover-up by not publishing the opinion in the
Federal Reporter and not emphasizing the district court's reasoning.
Such action, however, merely suggests that the bar is not well versed in
the differences between the TSA and federal securities acts.
3. Repurchase or Substitute Language in Prospectus Defeats a
Misrepresentation
In the second Fifth Circuit action involving both state and federal
claims, Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC88 encoun-
tered a fraud action against a bank for selling mortgage-backed securities
under the TSA, TSFA, and federal securities laws. The bank purchased
residential mortgages, placed them in trusts, and had the trusts issue se-
curities (trust interests) to an investor pursuant to prospectuses and sup-
plemental prospectuses. The supplemental prospectuses and the
representation and warranty agreements referenced in the supplemental
prospectuses contained representations and warranties by the bank for
each mortgage loan not thirty days or more delinquent since origination
of the loan. Both the supplemental prospectuses and the referenced rep-
resentation and warranty agreements also contained statements to the ef-
fect that the sole remedy for a breach of any such representation and
warranty was that the bank would repurchase the delinquent mortgage or
replace it with a non-delinquent mortgage.8 9 After discovering several
based on federal securities laws). That federal law provides the guarantee rule. See ABC
Arbitrage Plaintiffs Grp. v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 359 (5th Cir. 2002).
85. See Herrmann Holdings Ltd., 302 F.3d at 563 (interpreting the TSA); see also Flint,
supra note 82, at 2017 (discussing Herrmann Holdings Ltd).
86. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
87. Arkoma Basin Project, 384 F. App'x at 380. For Rule 10b-5 the investor needs to
prove (1) a material misstatement or omission, (2) scienter, (3) a connection with a
purchase or sale of securities, (4) reliance, (5) loss causation, and (6) economic loss. See
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
88. 594 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010) (opinion by C.J. Jones). The author served with Edith
Jones on the University of Texas Law School's Law Review in 1975. This article omits the
issue on jurisdiction.
89. Id. at 389.
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delinquent mortgages violating the representation and warranty, the in-
vestor brought suit against the bank for material misrepresentations
under the TSA, TSFA, and federal Securities Act.9° The district court
granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the ground that
all actions required a material misrepresentation and there was no al-
leged misrepresentation, much less a material one.9' The Fifth Circuit
affirmed.92
The first securities law issue for the Fifth Circuit in Lone Star Fund was
whether there was a misrepresentation. 93 The investor contended the
representation and warranty constituted misrepresentation.94 The Fifth
Circuit, however, determined that when reading misrepresentations all
language in the prospectus and accompanying documents should be read
together.95 Reading the representation and warranty along with the re-
purchase or substitute provision changes the nature of the statement to
one guaranteeing the mortgage loans will be compliant or will be made
compliant. Hence, there was no misrepresentation. 96 The second issue
was whether the repurchase or substitute provision amounted to a waiver
of the right to sue under the securities laws, which both the TSA and
federal securities laws prohibit. 97 The Fifth Circuit viewed the repurchase
or substitute provision not as a waiver, but as changing the nature of the
bank's representation. 98
Through Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., the Fifth Circuit created an-
other use for cautionary information. The general use defeats the materi-
ality requirement of a fraud action under the idea that no reasonable
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2006) (misrepresentation in a registration statement); 15
U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2006) (misrepresentations in a prospectus); 15 U.S.C. § 770 (2006) (lia-
bility of controlling persons).
91. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 3:08-CV-0261-L, 2008
WL 4449508, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2008).
92. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 594 F.3d at 390.
93. Id.
94. Appellant's Brief, Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d
383 (5th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-11038), 2009 WL 6445739 at *36-38. The repurchase or substi-
tution language related to remedies under 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) and TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 581-33D, not the misrepresentation. Id. at *37.
95. The Fifth Circuit cited an insurance contract interpretation case. See Lone Star
Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 594 F.3d at 389-90 (citing Transitional Learning Cmty. at Galveston,
Inc., v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 220 F.3d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 2000)). It is unclear this is
correct when different sorts of contracts have different interpretation rules. See, e.g.,
George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan Interpre-
tation, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 955, 996-1009 (1995) (noting ERISA plans don't use the
interpretation rules for collective bargaining agreements nor the interpretation rules for
insurance contracts). One bankruptcy court in the Fifth Circuit, however, recently applied
a modified version of the rule proposed in Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. for the TSA when
it held a court reads a statement in context along with the cautionary language when the
statement is not buried in information designed to obscure; see In re Perry, 404 B.R. 196,
216 (S.D. Tex. 2009); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 63 SMU L. REV.
795, 803-05 (2010) (discussing Perry).
96. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 594 F.3d at 389.
97. Id. at 390; see 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2009); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33L
(West 2011).
98. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 594 F.3d at 387-90.
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person attaches much significance to the misrepresentation in light of the
cautionary material when making the decision to purchase.99 Now, such
language in the Fifth Circuit might also negate a misrepresentation.100
B. COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACTS
Because the fraud provisions of the TSA are modeled on federal stat-
utes, there is an interest in Fifth Circuit securities law opinions. 01 Origi-
nally, this meant that Texas courts interpreting the TSA's similar
language looked to federal decisions under the federal statutes. 10 2 But
more recently, litigants and judges tend to graft federal concepts onto the
TSA even when the language is not similar.103
1. Loss Causation as a Prerequisite to the Fraud-on-the-Market
Presumption
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) of 1995104 to discourage extortive securities litigation. This in-
cludes filing class lawsuits for securities fraud whenever a significant
change in the issuer's price occurred followed by abuse of the discovery
process imposing burdensome costs, making it more economical for the
victimized issuers to settle. 10 5 This year's effort to protect investors from
lawyers extorting investor's corporate value involved the Fifth Circuit's
requirement for class certification of finding "loss causation" before al-
lowing substitution of fraud-on-the-market theory's rebuttable presump-
tion for the reliance element in a cause of action.' 06
In The Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc., v. Halliburton
Co., the plaintiffs went after an issuer under Rule 10b-5 in a class action
for alleged misstatements in three categories: (1) statements concerning
99. See In re Perry, 404 B.R. at 216 (applying it to the TSA); Kapps v. Torch Offshore,
Inc., 379 F.3d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 2004) (discussing federal securities act for misrepresenta-
tion in a registration statement); Olkey v. Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, Inc., 98 F.3d 2, 5 (2d
Cir. 1996); see also Flint, supra note 95, at 803-05 (2010) (discussing Perry).
100. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 594 F.3d at 388.
101. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. (West 2010) (Comment to 1977
Amendment).
102. See, e.g., Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v. Haskel, 193 S.W.3d 87, 103 n.13
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
103. See In re Enron Corporation Securities, Derivative and "ERISA" Litigation 623 F.
Supp. 2d 798, 814-16 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (failed attempt to graft federal "loss causation" onto
the TSA); Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying
federal rules to pleading fraud with particularity to the TSA and TSFA); see also George
Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 56 SMU L. REV. 1995, 2005 (2003) (discussing Dorsey).
104. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2009).
105. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730. For the fate of one such prominent extorter, see generally PATRICK
DILLON AND CARL CANNON, CIRCLE OF GREED: THE SPECTACULAR RISE AND FALL OF
THE LAWYER WHO BROUGHT CORPORATE AMERICA TO ITS KNEES 452 (2010) (William
Shannon Lerach of the Milberg Weiss law firm was sentenced to two years in jail in 2007
for illegal payments to plaintiffs and later disbarred in 2009).
106. See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 264-65
(5th Cir. 2007); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 61 SMU L. REV. 1107,
1128 (2008) (discussing Oscar).
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the issuer's exposure (arising from a former spun-off subsidiary of a
merger partner) to asbestos litigation and the stated reserves for that liti-
gation, (2) statements about the issuer's benefits from that merger, and
(3) improperly recording cost-overruns in fixed-price construction con-
tracts as revenue by deeming the cost-overruns as probable of collec-
tion.10 7  The elements of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action are material
misrepresentation (or omission), scienter, connection with purchase or
sale of a security, reliance, loss causation, and economic loss.10 8 To form
a class the court must find questions of fact to be predominately common
amongst the class members.10 9 To avoid placing an insurmountable evi-
dentiary burden on the client, the fraud-on-the-market presumption (that
available public material information on an issuer determines the issuer's
stock price in the open market on which all investors rely) satisfies the
commonality of the reliance element by creating a rebuttable presump-
tion upon a showing the issuer made public misstatements, those mis-
statements were material, the issuer's shares are traded in an efficient
market, and the client traded shares between the time of misstatement
and corrective disclosure. 1 0 To lessen the extortive impact of class certi-
fication, the Fifth Circuit will not find materiality unless the client shows
the corrective statement adversely impacted the issuer's price (that is, loss
causation), even at the class certification stage.'1 ' Finding no causal con-
nection between the alleged misstatements and the corrective statements,
the district court denied the client's motion for class certification. 112 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed, thwarting a major opportunity for an extortion
scheme that would arise upon class certification." 13
The securities law issue for the Fifth Circuit in Archdiocese concerned
whether the client had satisfied the materiality (loss causation) require-
ment for class certification." 14 The idea behind the fraud-on-the-market
theory is that a false statement causes an inflated issuer stock price. So in
the Fifth Circuit, loss causation for class certification has two require-
ments: the client shows materiality of a false statement by (1) connecting
the falsehood to a corrective statement and (2) showing that misstate-
107. 597 F.3d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded by Erica P. John Fund,
Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
108. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
109. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
110. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42, 245, 248 n.27 (1988) (definition,
reasons, and elements of fraud-on-the-market); Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364
F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 2004); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 58 SMU
L. REV. 1135, 1156-57 (2005) (discussing Greenberg).
111. Oscar Private Equity Jnvs., 487 F.3d at 266-67; see Fener v. Operating Eng'rs Con-
str. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund, 579 F.3d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 2009); Alaska Elec. Pension
Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 227-28 (5th Cir. 2009); Lormand v. US Unwired,
Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2009); George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 61
SMU L. REV. 1107, 1128-29 (2008) (discussing Oscar); George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities
Regulation, 63 SMU L. REV. 785, 809-15 (2010) (discussing Fener, Alaska Electrical Pen-
sion Fund, and Lormand).
112. The Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc., 597 F.3d at 334.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 335.
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ment, and not some other event, most likely caused the resulting price
change.115 With respect to asbestos litigation, the client failed the first
requirement. 116 The client produced various post-class period issuer
press releases and SEC filings that sequentially increased reserves for as-
bestos-related liability. The client did not produce any prior misstate-
ment concerning the asbestos reserves, instead relying on some inference
that these statements must correct something. The first reported state-
ment provided financial assistance to the pre-merger spun-off subsidiary
covering the former subsidiary's asbestos liabilities; the latter ones re-
ported additional recent judgments. These statements merely indicated
to the Fifth Circuit that the issuer was properly keeping the market
abreast of developments.' 17 An issuer is allowed to be proven wrong
with respect to its estimates. 1 8 With respect to the merger benefits, the
client failed to satisfy the second requirement.1 19 The alleged misstate-
ments made early in the class-period specified the expected savings while
the corrective statements (one from the issuer and one from analysts),
also made early in the class-period, reduced earnings estimates. The cor-
rective statements contained two other pieces of negative news (the de-
cline in offshore construction business and reduced spending levels by
energy industry customers) besides the less than expected profits from
the merger partner. The Fifth Circuit requires expert testimony and ana-
lytical research for multiple negative news to determine amount of loss, if
any, caused by the corrective statement. 120 The client's expert witness
failed to statistically or econometrically analyze three different pieces of
information. Moreover, the expert witness relied solely on news com-
mentary and analysts, a practice the Fifth Circuit rejects as merely well-
informed speculation. 121 With respect to the improper accounting, the
client failed to satisfy the first requirement. 2 2 The issuer made two cor-
rective press releases late in the class period. Both press releases related
to restructuring and restructuring charges, with no mention of fixed price
contracts, unapproved claims, or method of revenue recognition. The cli-
ent's expert witness could not match these corrective statements with any
prior issuer misstatement. 2 3
115. Greenburg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d at 666 (plaintiff must prove "(1) that
the negative 'truthful' information causing the decrease in price is related to an allegedly
false, non-confirmatory positive statement made earlier and (2) that it is more probable
than not that it was this negative statement, and not other unrelated negative statements,
that caused a significant amount of the decline."); see George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Reg-
ulation, 58 SMU L. REV. 1135, 1156-57 (2005) (discussing Greenberg).
116. The Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc., 597 F.3d at 340-41.
117. Id. at 341.
118. Id. at 343-44.
119. Id. at 341.
120. See Fener, 579 F.3d at 410-11; see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation,
63 SMU L. REV. 785, 814-15 (2010) (discussing Fener).
121. See Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 271; see also George Lee Flint, Jr.,
Securities Regulation, 61 SMU L. REV. 1107, 1128 (2008) (discussing Oscar).
122. The Archdioese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc., 597 F.3d at 342.
123. Id. at 339-44.
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The plaintiffs were so angered by the result that they suggested the
Fifth Circuit's requirement showing loss causation at the class certifica-
tion stage violated the Supreme Court's placement of the burden of proof
to rebut fraud-on-the-market. 24 But the plaintiff does have the burden
of proof for loss causation as an element in a cause of action for securities
fraud and for materiality (shown by the loss causation) as prerequisite of
the fraud-on-the-market presumption.12 5 The plaintiffs' counsel also
claimed that other circuits rejected the Fifth Circuit approach. 126 The
Seventh Circuit did reject the Fifth Circuit approach.12 7 The Second Cir-
cuit, however, adopted a middle position by holding an issuer may rebut
the fraud-on-the-market presumption before class certification.1 28 The
plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court re-
quested the acting Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of
the United States on this issue.' 29
2. Duty of Large Minority Shareholder for Misappropriation of Inside
Information
While Congress reined in class actions for securities fraud by private
investors, the SEC remains a viable option for prosecuting securities
fraud violations under rules against insider trading.130 Yet some refuse to
recognize the legal principles upon which those rules are based. For over
two centuries in the United States, there has been a duty to disclose un-
less the means of acquiring the information are equally accessible to both
parties. 131
124. Id. at 334 n.2; see Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988).
125. Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc., 597 F.3d at 335.
126. Appellant's Brief, Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton
Co., 597 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-11195), 2009 WL 6445755, at *32-34. The appel-
lant listed a few district court cases that rejected the Fifth Circuit approach. Id.; see In Re
HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 257 F.R.D. 260, 283 (N.D. Ala. 2009) ("[T]he Oscar case has
never been followed in the Eleventh Circuit and this court will not be the first to adopt
it."); In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig., 255 F.R.D. 519, 530 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("Oscar placed the
Fifth Circuit in a minority-indeed, apparently solitary-stance amount the circuits... ");
Lapin v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 254 F.R.D. 168,186 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("The Court... finds
that Oscar should be rejected as a misreading of Basic."); In re Nature's Sunshine Prods.
Inc. Sec. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 656, 665 (D. Utah 2008) ("[TJhe Fifth Circuit's decision in Oscar
appears to be in conflict with Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent which warn
against determining the merits at the class certification stage."); Ross v. Abercrombie &
Fitch Co., No. 2:05-CV-0819, 2008 WL 4059873, at *3 (S.D. Ohio 2008) ("No other Court
of Appeals, and no district court outside the Fifth Circuit, appears to have followed Os-
car."); Darquea v. Jarden Corp., No. 06-Civ. 722 (CLB), 2008 WL 622811, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (Oscar "is limited to the Fifth Circuit."); In re Micron Techs. Inc., Sec. Litig., 247
F.R.D. 627, 634 (D. Idaho 2007) ("It is unlikely that [Oscar] would be adopted in this
Circuit because it misreads Basic.").
127. Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685-87 (7th Cir. 2010).
128. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Lit., 544 F.3d 474, 485-86 (2d Cir. 2010).
129. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., fka Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 856 (2010) (proceedings and orders), available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?FileName=/Docketfiles/09-1403.htm.
130. See 17 C.F.R. §§ lOb5-1 & 10b5-2 (2010).
131. Cf Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178, 194 (1817) (C.J. Marshall) (sale of tobacco
within one hour after peace treaty was posted by handbill ending British blockade of New
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This year's effort by the SEC to protect investors from large minority
shareholders too rich to abide by the laws involved the misappropriation
theory of insider trading by a shareholder owning six percent of the is-
suer.1 32 The complaint in SEC v. Cuban stated the issuer decided to raise
capital through a private investment of public equity offering (sale of
public shares to private investors at a discount to the market price). 133
The issuer's investment banker recommended the issuer's chief executive
officer contact the large minority shareholder, Cuban, to invite him to
participate in the offering. Before conveying this information to Cuban,
the investment banker told the chief executive officer to instruct Cuban
to keep the information confidential. Cuban did not like such offerings,
stating, "[N]ow I'm screwed. I can't sell." The CEO's report to the is-
suer's board indicated Cuban would sell his shares, although not until
announcing the offering, but he also asked to see the terms and condi-
tions arranged so he could decide whether to participate in the offer-
ing.1 34 The chief executive officer emailed Cuban to contact the
investment banker if he wanted more details. Cuban contacted the in-
vestment banker and learned of the magnitude of the offering's discount.
Immediately after contacting the investment banker, Cuban sold all his
shares to the issuer. A second email from the chief executive officer to
the board indicated that after contact with the chief executive officer and
underwriter, Cuban would not invest in the offering and would sell his
shares, only after the offering 1 35 Upon the announcement of the offer-
ing, the issuer's stock price declined eight percent the next day and thirty-
nine percent over the next week. The SEC filed a lawsuit against Cuban
for violation of the securities laws in order to obtain an "injunction
against future violations of the securities laws, disgorgement of losses
avoided, prejudgment interest, and imposition of a civil monetary pen-
alty."' 136 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district
court determined the Supreme Court required not only a confidentiality
agreement, but also an agreement not to trade. 137 In granting the mo-
tion, the district court concluded that Cuban's "I can't sell" statement did
Orleans did not give rise to the duty of buyer, who saw handbill, to inform seller because
the information was accessible to both parties).
132. SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2010). The Exchange Act deems share-
holders with more than ten percent ownership as insiders. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a)(1)
(2006).
133. Complaint at 11, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 3-
08CV2050-D), 2008 WL 4901149.
134. Id. at 15.
135. Id. at 20.
136. SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 718 (N.D. Tex 2009); see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
1(A)(3) (2006) (up to treble damages in an SEC action for insider trading); 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a)-(b) (2006) (fraud in the sale of a security); 15 U.S.C. § 7j (2006) (manipulation
and deceptive devices in contravention of rules); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010) (fraud in
connection with the sale or purchase of a security).
137. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 725-26; see United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654,
655 (1977) (stating "[dieception through nondisclosure is central to the [misappropriation]
theory of liability . . . " and "[b]ecause the deception essential to the misappropriation
theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to
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not amount to an agreement not to sell and dismissed the chief executive
officer's emails as unilateral expectations not based on the other party's
agreement. 138 The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. 139
The securities law issue addressed by the Fifth Circuit dealt with the
interpretation of the complaint; the court did not agree that the com-
plaint only alleged a confidentiality agreement. 140 Before making the "I
can't sell" statement, Cuban requested the terms and conditions of the
offering. He misled the chief executive officer as to the timing of his sale
to obtain a confidential look at the offering terms for his own benefit.
Pursuant to that deceptive request, the chief executive officer sent the
contact information. Only after Cuban reached out to obtain the offer-
ing's pricing, following his statement of understanding he could not sell,
did he sell his shares. Hence, it was plausible that each party understood,
if only implicitly, that the issuer would release the pricing information for
the purpose of Cuban's evaluation to participate in the offering and that
Cuban could not use that information for his own personal benefit. 14a
The securities issue avoided by the Fifth Circuit's reading of the peti-
tion concerned statutory authorization for Rule 10b5-2(b), which applies
misappropriation of non-public information in cases when a trader agreed
to maintain the information in confidence only.' 42 Because the district
court concluded Cuban agreed to keep the information confidential and
yet traded (a violation of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)) and had determined that
misappropriation theory under Supreme Court jurisprudence requires de-
ception, it determined that Rule 10b5-2 exceeded the SEC's authority
under Section 10b of the Exchange Act the rule described no deception
under its interpretation of the law. 143 The Fifth Circuit's dodge of the
Rule 10b5-2 vitality may mean the rule still has some force in the Fifth
Circuit. 14
4
The Fifth Circuit also suggested two other theories besides the misap-
propriation theory, where Cuban may have violated insider trading
the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no 'deceptive
device.' ... ").
138. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 727-28.
139. Cuban, 620 F.3d at 556-58.
140. Id. at 552.
141. Id. at 557.
142. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2010).
143. Cuban, 634 F.3d at 730-31; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). This was the result
sought by certain misguided law professors. See Amended Brief of Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex.
2009) (No. 3:08-CV-02050(SAF)), 2009 WL 1257407 at *1 (expressing the belief that mis-
appropriation only applies to fiduciary relationships); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Law
Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellee, SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010)
(No. 09-10996), 2010 WL 3576550 at *5-6 (decrying the SEC's effort to expand misappro-
priation theory and suggesting courts should leave confidence breaches as breach of con-
tracts to state law). To the district court's credit, it rejected the fiduciary approach and
recognized that breach of a contract could supply the necessary deception. See Cuban, 634
F.3d at 724.
144. Cf Cuban, 620 F.3d at 558, n.40 ("nor must we reach the validity of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1).").
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rules.145 First, Cuban's reading of the complaint-that he had an exclu-
sive license to trade on the material non-public information-suggests
tipper/tippee liability.1 46 Tipper/tippee liability only requires an insider
to have breached his or her duty to shareholders by disclosing the non-
public information to the tippee when the tippee knows or should have
known there was a breach1 47 The tipper's breach occurs when the tipper
receives a benefit from the disclosure. 148 A reputational benefit translat-
ing into future earnings constitutes that benefit. 149 If the facts show the
chief executive officer knowingly gave Cuban material non-public infor-
mation and arranged so he could trade on it, a court might infer the chief
executive officer did so for a personal benefit: the good will from a
wealthy investor. 150 Second, Cuban's deception itself may provide liabil-
ity without resort to misappropriation theory. 151 The Second Circuit
found an options trader liable under Rule 10b-5 without requiring a
breach of fiduciary duty when the trader affirmatively misrepresented
himself in order to gain access to nonpublic information used in his op-
tions trading.' 52 Such misrepresentation is an deceptive act.' 53
Cuban's defense to the SEC's attempts to protect investors is to harass
the SEC. A month after the filing of the SEC's complaint in Dallas, Cu-
ban requested much documentation under the Freedom of Information
Act,154 including documents concerning the SEC's internal investigations
of the SEC lawyers filing the complaint and the trading of SEC personnel
in the issuer's stock.' 55 Failing to rapidly obtain the information due to
the SEC's policy of responding on a first come basis, and the volume and
complexity of the documents requested, Cuban filed an action against the
SEC in Washington, D.C. to compel production of the information. 156
The second stage of the harassment involved Cuban seeking legal fees
from the SEC for prosecutorial misconduct in its pre-suit investigation
145. Id. at 557.
146. Id. at 557, n.38.
147. Id. at 554 (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983)).
148. Id. (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663).
149. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64.
150. See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003).
151. See Cuban, 620 F.3d at 557.
152. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49-50 (2d Cir. 2009).
153. Id. at 51.
154. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
155. Compare Complaint, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 3-
08CV2050D), 2008 WL 4901149 at *1 (listing SEC attorneys as Aderton, Chaudoin, Freis-
tad, Kaplan, O'Rourke, and Riewe) with Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
Cuban v. SEC, 2010 WL 3777844 (D.D.C.) (No. 109-CV-00996), 2009 WL 1619336 at *1
(describing Freedom of Information Act requests for information including applications
for award of bounty in his case, trading transactions by SEC employees in certain issuers'
stock, and any internal investigation of SEC personnel Aderton, Chaudoin, Freistad,
Kaplan, O'Rourke, and Riewe).
156. Cuban v. SEC, 2010 WL 3777844, at *3 (D.D.C.); see Declaration of Margaret
Celia Winter at 155, Cuban v. SEC, 2010 WL 3777844 (No. 109CV00996), 2010 WL 94337
(stating that request for documentation won't reach first position for three years and will




motivated by a bias against Cuban, evidenced among other actions by e-
mails sent between SEC officials mocking him and repeated questioning
of key witnesses in the case. 157 With such lawsuit harassment pending,
Cuban's own lawyers will soon separate him from his ill-gotten gains.
IV. CONCLUSION
The securities law opinions under Texas law during this Survey period
can be divided into two groups. The first grouping deals with various
fraudulent schemes targeted by the Board. The "free lunch" scam aimed
at senior investors surfaced in Head v. State.158 The scammer lost the
appeal of his conviction for failure to inform investors, because the evi-
dence clearly confirmed that failure. 159 In Navarro v. Grant Thornton,
LLP investors failed in their aiding and abettor lawsuit against the ac-
countants. 160 Absent contact between the accountants and investors, the
accountants have no duty to whistle-blow to regulators or investors. In-
competent lawyers, or lawyers who convinced their clients to pay for half-
baked arguments, constitute the second grouping. In S & D Trading
Academy, LLC v. AAFIS Inc., an unregistered investment advisor failed
to collect unpaid fees because it did not fit the teacher exception to regis-
tration for investment advisers for its day-trading instruction.161 The in-
vestment advisor was not an accredited institution of higher learning and
the instructors were not professional teachers. In Arkoma Basin Project
Limited Partnership v. West Fork Energy Company LLC, natural gas pro-
ducers escaped liability for failing to meet certain projections, although
they satisfied the early stages of their projections. 162 There is no materi-
ality for securities fraud for projected future performance unless worded
as guarantees. 163 In Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank
PLC, a bank did not misrepresent the quality of mortgages in mortgage
backed securities when it stated in the offering materials that it would
repurchase the offending mortgages or substitute qualifying mortgages,
and did so when requested.164
Under the federal securities laws, the Fifth Circuit dealt with loss cau-
sation and misappropriation theory. In Archdiocese of Milwaukee Sup-
porting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., the Fifth Circuit confirmed its
requirement of a class-action plaintiff's showing of loss causation at the
class certification stage before the plaintiff can use the fraud-on-the-mar-
157. SEC v. Cuban, No. 3:08-CV-2050-D, 2009 WL 4544178, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4,
2009); see 28 U.S.C. § 2421(b) (2006); see also Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th
Cir. 1992) (citing F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116
(1974) (stating that fees will be awarded if the party acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wan-
tonly, or for oppressive reasons")).
158. 299 S.W.3d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th] 2009, pet. ref'd).
159. Id. at 430.
160. 316 S.W.3d 715, 717 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
161. 336 F. App'x 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 1054 (2010).
162. 384 F. App'x 375, 380-81 (5th Cir. 2010).
163. Id. at 380.
164. 594 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 2010).
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ket rebuttable presumption. 165 Because the Seventh Circuit rejected this
approach and the Second Circuit places the burden of proof on the defen-
dant, this case will continue to foster interest. In SEC v. Cuban, the Fifth
Circuit reinstated an insider trading case by determining the complaint
did allege sufficiently that the tippee misled the tipper in order to misap-
propriate the confidential information used in trading.' 66 Because the
tippee has inaugurated an all-out war against the SEC, this case will also
engender future interest.
165. 597 F.3d 330, 344 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded by Erica P. John Fund,
Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
166. 620 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2010).
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